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Abstract 
 
How did post-communist transformations affect people’s perceptions of their 
economic and political systems? We model a pseudo-panel with 89 country-year 
clusters, based on 13 countries observed between 1991 and 2004, to identify the 
macro and institutional drivers of the public opinion. Our main findings are: (i) When 
the economy is growing, on average people appreciate more extensive reforms; 
they dislike unbalanced reforms. (ii) Worsening of income distribution and higher 
inflation interact with an increasing share of the private sector in aggravating 
nostalgia for the past regime. (iii) Cross-country differences in the attitudes towards 
the present and future (both in the economic and political dimensions) are largely 
explained by differences in the institutional indicators for the rule of law and 
corruption. (iv) Cross-country differences in the extent of nostalgia towards the past 
are mainly related to differences in the deterioration of standards of living. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought about a new world of hope and opportunities for peoples 
and countries that engaged along the path of the post-communist transformation.  Many post-
communist countries, especially those nearer to the Eastern boundaries of the European Union,
2
 soon 
adopted the institutions of democracy and agreed that the setting up of a market economy would be 
an essential ingredient of it.
3
 People gained at the same time freedom of thought, speech and action, 
and the opportunity to grow rich. Under these circumstances, it might have been reasonable to 
expect that the new, post-communist citizens should just work hard and be happy. Instead, the 
transformation proved to be a bumpier road than it had been envisaged. People soon began to voice 
their doubts and concerns, rather than an overwhelming satisfaction, and those doubts have not yet 
faded away. In fact, political scientists had warned not to expect that everything would flow smoothly 
during the transformation. “Because a communist regime had a non-market command economy run 
by bureaucrats, post-communist regimes must create market institutions at the same time as 
democratic institutions. The simultaneous transformation of polity and economy, and the potentially 
explosive interaction between the two, makes outcomes uncertain. … The practice of governance in a 
newly created democracy is a process of trial and error, a search across a terrain for which there is no 
map. … Change can lead in more than one direction.  Only a ‘democratic bolshevik’ would believe that 
introducing democratic institutions in place of a communist regime could immediately produce a 
stable democracy.” (Rose, Mischler and Haerpfer, 1998, p.7).  
In this respect we can see at least two different patterns of transformation. In those countries that 
were closer to the EU, democracy has proved remarkably stable, while setting up ex novo a market 
economy has proved difficult, and many citizens  have been disappointed in the process. On the other 
hand, in countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) uncertainty has been 
more fundamentally centered around the characteristics of the political process. Overall, according to 
a broad survey conducted in 2007 by the EBRD,  almost half of the people interviewed disagreed (and 
only 35% agreed) with the statement that the economic situation in their country today is better than 
around 1989, with similar numbers corresponding to the political situation (EBRD, 2007a; see also 
Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). But why is that?  Of course, it may be possible to interpret these (and 
other findings of a similar tone) as only signaling the end of a “honeymoon effect”, or as an exercise in 
the rhetoric of self-deprecation. Or, alternatively, they might point to a real source of discontent – in 
which case it becomes interesting to find out more about its causes. 
                                                          
2
   Until 1989 the EU (then the European Community) had only 12 members. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined only in 
1995, after the fall of the Wall. 
3
   Note that the opposite would not be necessarily true, as a market economy does not always require democracy. Staher 
(2006) provides an empirical confirmation of this presumption. 
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One way to analyze discontent, or disillusionment, as the consequence of a rational (re)assessment, is 
to link it to the evidence of unfulfilled or disappointed expectations, which in turn may have been 
nurtured by the experiences of individual failures and defeats. In fact, personal disappointment may 
become a relevant political factor, as it might explain how a majority that initially supported reforms 
could turn  into a majority that opposes their continuation or even demands their reversal. 
4
 A search 
for evidence in favor of such explanations motivates our research.   
More generally, the research questions which we address are related to how people react to the 
experience of a process of political and economic transformations that affect their current welfare 
and their expectations for the future.  Some of these questions are naturally addressed in a 
comparative framework:  
• How do judgments about the past and the present and expectations for the future differ across 
post-communist countries? 
• Are these differences related to the different paths of reforms and transformations across 
countries? 
These broad questions lead us to pose more specific ones, that might be addressed in parallel for all 
countries: 
• Are assessments about the past, present and future affected by the same or by different 
groups of variables?   
• Do  individual evaluations about the economic system move in parallel to those for the political 
system, or is each sphere of judgments related to different groups of observable variables?  
• How do these assessments change as reforms are implemented and the economy grows? 
To address these questions, we will focus on the determinants of the aggregate (median) assessments 
prevailing in each country at a particular time. More specifically, our study is based on the aggregate 
analysis of individual micro data. Thus, although it is based on the same dataset used in the related 
micro analysis described in Rovelli and Zaiceva (2011), this paper has a distinct macro focus. (See 
below for more details on the dataset.)  
The theoretical motivation for this paper is related to a long lasting debate. For our purposes, we take 
as a first reference point the paper by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), which identified theoretically-
relevant stylized facts that later characterized most political economy (PE) analyses of the post-
communist transformation. In particular they observed that post-communist reforms needed to 
generate a substantial shift of economic activities from the state to the private sector. If this shift is 
                                                          
4   
This observation is related to Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), whose central idea was in turn foreshadowed by 
Machiavelli’s (1513) remarks on the difficulty and danger of “an attempt to introduce a new order of things in any 
state”. From these contributions we retain the idea that, once introduced, reforms may lose popular support, as the ex 
post distribution of gains and losses may no longer generate a democratic majority of supporters
.
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either too fast or too slow, as it may often be the case, then it might run out of steam as it does not 
generate a sufficient amount of resources to support itself.
5
 Although Aghion and Blanchard’s is not a 
PE paper, it has nevertheless opened the way for several studies in that vein. These were based on 
recognizing that different configurations of post-communist reforms would essentially generate 
different patterns of winners and losers, and thus might be alternatively chosen, depending on 
alternative configurations of the political process.  
The  range and depth of post-communist transformations has naturally attracted a large amount of 
research.  Common to all the transition economies was the need to restructure internal production, 
to open up to new patterns of international trade, and to reallocate labor across regions, sectors and 
firms (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). The necessary reforms, which included privatization, trade 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization, took place in a situation of institutional change, where 
many institutions that had provided social insurance under the previous socialist system had 
collapsed, and other institutions, which were needed to ensure the well functioning of transitional 
reforms, such as taxation or banking, had to be introduced on entirely new grounds.  
As observed by Boeri and Terrell (2002), the extent to which labor reallocation has taken place within 
a country is a strong indicator of progress made along the path of transitional reforms. In this respect,  
the adjustment patterns of the output and labor markets differed substantially between the Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) and CIS countries. With a few exceptions, most CEE countries 
experienced a U-shaped pattern of GDP, a large fall in employment early in the 1990s and some 
decline in labor productivity leading to rapid structural change but also to high unemployment (with 
the exception of the Czech Republic), much of which was long term. In contrast, the CIS countries 
typically faced an L-shaped pattern of GDP during the 1990s and a relatively modest decline in 
employment with limited sectoral reallocations of labor. Here, however, there was a more 
pronounced deterioration in labor productivity and of real wages, as well as a significantly larger 
increase in inequality than in the CEE countries (Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Svejnar, 2002; Milanovic and 
Ersado, 2008). Overall, while the labor market adjustment process took the form of larger declines in 
employment in the CEE countries, it typically occurred through real wage declines in the CIS. And only 
as transition progressed, unemployment began to increase gradually also in the CIS countries 
(Svejnar, 2002).  
In this paper we shall treat these decisions about adoption, design and sequence of reforms as factors 
affecting how the public opinion assessed the process of transition. Thus, our empirical analysis is 
related to two strands of research: (i) the earlier studies using macro-economic variables to explain 
voting behavior (Fidrmuc, 2000), support for the market economy (Hayo, 2004; Kim and Pirttilä, 2006) 
                                                          
5
  In particular, if the rate of labor shedding by the state sector is too fast it might actually (i) reduce the speed of 
restructuring in state firms as workers resist managers’ attempts to restructure, (ii) reduce the level of aggregate 
demand, and also (iii) hinder the speed of job creation in the emerging private sector. This latter result will come about 
to the extent that higher unemployment translates into higher taxes (and less profits) for newly created firms, which as 
the only profitable and hence taxable units of the economy bear the entire costs of the unemployment benefits. 
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or “capitalism aversion” (Landier et al., 2008); (ii) the more recent cross-country studies based on 
micro data which have sought to analyze the “unhappiness in transition” (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 
2009; Easterlin, 2009), the determinants of public dislike for privatization policies (Denisova et al., 
2007), the evolution of support for both economic and political changes (Rovelli and Zaiceva, 2011). 
This last paper, in a study of 14 countries from 1991 to 2004, provides a systematic characterization of 
winners and losers, and a comparison of individual attitudes towards the post-communist 
transformation across space and time. One of the main findings is that the older, less skilled, 
unemployed and poorer people, and also those living in the CIS countries, were less likely to support 
the changes in the economic and political system that were brought by the transition. Also, for the CIS 
countries,  preferences for a greater role of the state in the economy and for more secure jobs, and 
subjective lack of trust in political institutions, together with the lower quality of political institutions 
(as measured by the governance indicators) contribute to a negative attitude towards economic 
reforms. In relation to this, the data also show that a negative opinion about the present is often 
associated we with a state of “nostalgia” about the communist regime. We briefly comment about 
this in the next section. 
Our main objective is to explain why apparently similar policies adopted across different countries 
generated different levels of popular support. In this respect we follow Guriev and Zhuravskaya 
(2009) and Rovelli and Zaiceva (2011) although, as anticipated above, our approach to the data is 
different, as we concentrate here only on two data dimensions (time and space), neglecting variability 
across individuals. This allows us to concentrate on the macro, institutional and policy influences on 
the public opinion. One aspect which we highlight – and which will be supported by our results - is 
that each reform should not be taken and valued by itself. In many instances, a reform is in fact part 
of package, bundled together with other potentially complementary reforms. Moreover, each reform 
or package interacts with the effects of previous and subsequent reforms, and of old and new 
institutions. This idea of reform complementarity has been pursued empirically by Staehr (2005) for 
transition countries and, in a broader context, by Braga de Macedo and Oliveira Martins (2008), who 
study the impact of complementarities on the growth rate of transition economies. Our hypothesis is 
that the concept of complementarity between reforms should also apply to their perceived costs and 
benefits, so that the approval or disapproval rate of each reform may also depend on which other 
reforms are associated with it. Our research strategy then follows from the formulation of this 
hypothesis: thus in the first part of the paper we examine synthetic measures of people’s judgments 
about the transition process, and in the second part we model the relations between these judgments 
and variables measuring the state of the economy, the pattern of reforms and the quality of 
institutions. One limitation of our approach is that we concentrate on measures of the median or 
average public opinion, thus neglecting the dispersion or variability of people’s opinions. We plan to 
take measures of the dispersion of the public opinion explicitly into account in a related research.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and in Section 3 we explain how 
individual responses can be usefully synthesized in two variables or macro factors: FM1, which 
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synthesizes the median individual response about the present and the future of the economic and 
political systems; FM2, which synthesizes responses relative to the past economic and political 
systems. In section 4 we introduce and motivate our framework for the empirical analysis of these 
two macro factors and in section 5 we present estimates of a corresponding macro pseudo-panel 
model. We find that the state of advancement of the reform process and macroeconomic 
performance are important determinants of F1, while other macro variables, that measure the impact 
of transition on different social groups, are the main determinants of F2. In Section 6 we re-
parameterize the model to emphasize the differences across countries. We find these differences to 
be unrelated to variables that explain the evolution of responses within each country; on the 
contrary, they are strongly related to relatively time-invariant cross-county institutional and economic 
differences. Section 7 sums up and concludes. 
 
2. The data: The NEB surveys and the six basic response variables 
 
As we anticipated in the Introduction, our research is part of an ongoing project, devoted to the 
analysis of a large data set, comprising several thousands of interviews, conducted in 14 post-
communist countries from 1991 to 2004. Interviews were collected over time and published in 
separate datasets by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of Aberdeen 
(see below). Interviewees were asked to express their opinions on several aspects of the economic 
and political life. The original datasets have been coded into a single dataset, as reported in Rovelli 
and Zaiceva (2009), who also provide a first detailed econometric analysis of the responses. In this 
paper we propose a complementary, aggregative approach to the same issues. Rather than focusing 
on and characterizing differences between individual responses, here we focus on the “macro” drivers 
of individual attitudes. Hence our analysis explores how the median voter (the median interviewed 
person) did react to the changing performance of the economy and to the transitional reforms. 
The data. Median opinion data are aggregated from micro data, originated from a number of large 
surveys, consistently conducted over time by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the 
University of Aberdeen and the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna. Each surveys is based on a 
representative sample of the population in each of 14 transition countries. They are available from 
CSPP under the separate names of New Europe Barometer, New Russia Barometer and New Baltic 
Barometer; each Barometer contains between 4 and 7 surveys (“waves”) conducted in each country 
between 1991 and 2004.  Ten countries in the sample became members of the EU in the 2004 or 2007 
enlargements (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia); Croatia is currently a EU candidate; Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are members 
of the CIS.  Each survey contains a large number of common questions, in particular questions on 
individual opinions about the past and present economic and political systems. Hence the set of 
available surveys constitutes a unique dataset that allows meaningful cross-country comparisons from 
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1991 until 2004. In particular we use a single dataset based on the separate CSPP files, as extensively 
explained in Rovelli and Zaiceva (2009). See also the Data Appendix . 
In conjunction with these survey data we also use macro-economic and institutional variables, in 
particular to measure the spread and intensity of transitional reforms. Also these data are described 
in the Data Appendix. 
The six basic responses. In the New Europe Barometer (NEB) surveys, individuals from fourteen 
countries are asked questions on how they think the economic and the political systems work in their 
countries. Distinct questions are asked for the past (defined as the former socialist or communist 
regime), the present and the future (“in five years time”). Table 1 synthesizes the phrasing of the six 
questions, and reports the corresponding names of the coded answers.  
Table 1  here 
Each response to these questions is measured in three dimensions, which refer to different 
individuals (i), located in different countries (c) at different points in time (t). Hence each observation 
is characterized as  y i, c, t. Note that time is not observed on a regular annual base.  
Table 2  here 
In Table 2 we report the total number of questionnaires obtained for each country and year. Overall 
there are 89 country-year cells. 1993 and 1995 are the only years in which all countries were 
surveyed, and then again in 2004, except for Croatia. These three (out of nine) years cover almost half 
of the whole sample (102,368 observations).  Each country covers between 5 and 7 percent of the 
sample, with the exceptions of Russia (which by design had a sample size almost twice that of the 
other countries) and Croatia (with only four waves of interviews).  
Table 3  here 
In Table 3 we report descriptive statistics of the six basic responses. Out of a total of 102,368 
interviews, the share of non-responses varies between 5-15% of the interviews. Non responses are 
more frequent for the two questions about the future. We were surprised to observe that the mean 
response to PRESEC is negative, while that to PASTEC is positive. On average, people seem more optimist 
about the future than they are satisfied about the present; also the past is generally rated better than 
the present. This evidence is perhaps surprising, but in fact it a common finding, also in other 
contexts. As Munro (2006) observes, “the phenomenon of widespread nostalgia has been noted in 
scholarly circles in Russia … and amongst policy-makers in the United States, where it has even been 
seen as cause for concern because it implies low potential for a democratic breakthrough”. And also 
“Russia is not unique [among former communist countries], in having high levels of nostalgia. The 
2004 New Europe Barometer survey showed that an average of 54 per cent of citizens of the eight 
post-Communist new EU members gave the old regime a positive assessment. The most nostalgic new 
EU country was Slovenia with 70 percent giving the Yugoslav regime founded by Tito a positive rating 
and the least was the Czech Republic, where Soviet troops enforced the Brezhnev doctrine at 
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gunpoint: there 31 per cent were nostalgic.”
6
 Even if nostalgia is not directly “action oriented”, it is 
nevertheless a worrying phenomenon. Moreover, the implications of nostalgia for economic analysis 
and for economic policy making are still to be explored. In this respect, it may be helpful to be 
reminded that “Uncertainty (unsureness) is a deep property of  decentralized systems in which a 
myriad of independent agents make decisions … Uncertainty about what the outcomes will be follows 
from the uncertainty with which agents hold the model that guides their actions”(Minsky, 1996). In 
this vein of thought, it may be true that, while struggling to “learn”, that is to overcome uncertainty 
about the current (and evolving) model of society and the economy , some people – and especially 
those who think they are likely to be among the “losers” in the new environment, resort to nostalgia. 
And this may be occurring even more often, if the previous regime had engendered the expectation 
of being entitled to certain welfare benefits, which the losers then internalize as their “moral property 
right” (Gächter and Riedl, 2002). 
Turning to the statistics presented in Table 3, we also observe that, while the sample means of the six 
variables are quite different, their standard deviations are remarkably close to each other.  To 
understand the sources of heterogeneity by country and over time, we first computed the means and 
standard deviations for each of the 89 country-year clusters counted in Table 2; we then decomposed 
their variability between countries and over time in three parts: one share is explained by differences 
in country means or standard deviations (“country effect”), a second share by a time-varying (macro) 
drift common to all countries (“time effect”), while the residual share captures idiosyncratic factors.  
For the means of individual responses, the country effect is always the main determinant of the 
heterogeneity in the responses about the past and the present, while idiosyncratic effects account for 
the largest shares of variability in those about the future. The same is true for the standard 
deviations, although the residual effects are in general larger for all the six variables. The drifts over 
time of the means and standard deviations of the individual responses are not particularly relevant. 
Since the heterogeneity of responses across countries is quite large and tends to dominate the overall 
variability, it will be important to account for this dimension in our analysis (see Section 6). On the 
other hand, we can exploit the strong correlation between the six basic response variables within 
each country-year: by doing so, we avoid the difficult task of modeling the variability of the six 
variables of interest in fourteen countries along only a few years. The simple correlation matrix 
between these variables is reported in Table 4, from which we draw two conclusions: first, the two 
responses concerning evaluation of the past regimes are strongly correlated with each other, but not 
with the other four variables, and vice versa the four response variables concerning the present and 
the future are strongly correlated with each other, and not with those concerning the past: in short, 
                                                          
6
  Munro (2006) defines nostalgia  “as a positive view of the past regime, based on a holistic evaluation of its faults and 
merits. It should be distinguished from reaction--a desire to return to the status quo ante. In the Russian context this 
means returning to the Communist regime, or to a feasible reincarnation of it. Reaction is a more extreme position than 
nostalgia, and it is also more “action-oriented.” 
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the block of the two responses about the past does not significantly covariate with the block of the 
four responses about the present and future. We checked the robustness of this finding across the 89 
country-year clusters (see Figures 1 and 2). Figure 1  plots the nine correlation coefficients in which at 
least one of the two variables is either PASTEC or PASTPOL (corresponding to the first two columns of the 
correlation matrix in Table 4), and Figure 2 plots only the correlations of responses concerning the 
present and/or the future (corresponding to the last four columns of  Table 4). Results are strikingly 
clear, with rare exceptions: visual inspection of the two Figures shows that the correlation structure 
which emerges from Table 4 is remarkably stable both within each country and over time: the only set 
of coefficients that are clearly different from zero in Figure 1 is that which involves the correlation 
between PASTEC and PASTPOL,  and on the contrary all the blocks in Figure 2 report (with minor 
exceptions) non-zero coefficients between the responses on the present and the future. This in turn 
suggests that we may use statistical methods to reduce the dimensionality of the six groups of 
individual responses, as we describe in the next section. 
Table 4   &  Figures 1 and 2  here 
 
3. Two summary measures of individual responses 
 
One crucial finding reported in the previous section is that individual evaluations of the economic and 
the political system tend to be very closely related with each other, for each time horizon(see the 
correlations reported in Table 4 and in Figures 1 and 2). This overlap of responses is quite surprising, 
and we believe that it may be due to the fairly general way in which the corresponding questions have 
been phrased, rather than to the inability of the interviewees to distinguish in principle between the 
two spheres. In any case, we will not attempt to distinguish between these two dimensions in this 
paper, and we shall leave this task to further research.  
On the other hand, we can use the information provided by each set of responses (on the economy 
and on the polity) to reinforce the information from the other. Accordingly, and following the 
suggestion of Anderson (1974, p. 272-273), our empirical analysis will focus on those combinations of 
responses which concentrate the largest variability of the individual responses. Therefore we study 
the differences in the individual responses on the political and economic systems by using appropriate 
orthogonal linear combinations, such as the principal components of the individual responses.
7
 
An additional reason to “compact” the individual responses in just a few variables is also suggested by 
the characteristics of the empirical analysis that we will conduct.  In this respect, our aim it to identify 
                                                          
7
 The broad idea of factor analysis is to obtain estimates of latent variables which lay behind the individual responses, and 
which can be measured only by using the observed responses.  
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the macro and institutional determinants (“drivers”) of the individual judgments. To this purpose, we 
will naturally focus on what distinguishes each country-year cluster from the others.  This in turn 
requires to conduct a dynamic analysis, which however will be constrained in several dimensions: 
gaps in the time series; non-observable explanatory variables; collinearity between includable 
variables. Given the limited sample size, estimated models may be negatively affected by data 
anomalies such as outliers and structural breaks. With potentially up to six dependent variables, the 
usual collinearity to be found in many sets of socio-economic variables will be even more pervasive, 
as we might find ourselves plagued by a sort of “double collinearity”, affecting both sets of dependent 
and explanatory variables. To reduce the consequences of this, it is helpful to summarize the 
dependent variables on the basis of their underlying statistical factors. In particular two features of 
factor analysis may help to contain the damages from collinearity: (i) factors are orthogonal to each 
other by construction; (ii) within each factor, the statistical averaging of responses dampens other 
data anomalies. In short, we believe that the loss of information coming from the aggregation of 
responses will be overcome by the advantages of data aggregation mentioned above. On the other 
hand, we will also perform several  ex post checks and tests of the appropriateness of this approach. 
 
3.1 - Micro factors. We first introduce formally the process of data aggregation. Let X = (PASTEC, PRESEC, 
FUTEC, PASTPOL, PRESPOL, FUTPOL)’ be a matrix where the questions are in different rows, and the 
observations (answers) are in columns (each individual answer refers to a country at a given point in 
time).
8
 Define as  xi c t  the vector of p standardized responses (in our case p = 6)  by the i-th individual 
in country c at time t. We can express xi c t  as a linear function of k latent factors: 
xi c t = Λ c fi c t + εi c t  ,    for  c = 1, …, 14              (1) 
where   Λc   is a country-specific   p × k  matrix of factor loadings ( k < p ),   fc t i  is the  k × 1  vector of 
orthogonal latent factor scores (i.e. the common factors), and  εc t i  is a  p-vector of uncorrelated 
idiosyncratic disturbances, i.e. p judgment-specific factors assumed uncorrelated with the common 
factors  f .
 
 
Although principal components and factor analysis are different multivariate methods,
9
 principal 
components can be seen as one of the alternative approaches to estimate the factor loadings matrix 
Λc   and to extract factor scores that, in large samples and/or with communality (i.e. the sum of the 
squared factor loadings) close to one, should be very similar to those extracted with genuine factor 
analysis approaches.  
                                                          
8
 Since the second moments of the variables depend on their scale, it is customary to first standardize by country each 
variable in X to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each country.  
9
 In order to reconstruct the six variables of interest, factor analysis requires to specify the model of equation (10) with the 
introduction of stochastic disturbances, while principal components analysis assumes that there are no disturbance 
terms, and thus it can be considered a sort of deterministic factor analysis. 
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In order to assess whether the similarities of the scores imply the robustness of the findings of this 
paper to the use of alternative approaches, we extracted factors by using three main extractors: 
principal components factoring, principal factoring, and maximum likelihood factoring. In doing that, 
we always applied orthogonal varimax rotations to the loadings matrix in order to obtain a 
parsimonious and more interpretable representation of  Λc , i.e. with few large loadings and as many 
as possible near-zero loadings.  
In order to estimate the number of latent factors at the level of each country, Table 5 reports, along 
six columns, the ordered eigenvalues λj  (j = 1, 2, ..., 6) of the empirical covariance matrix of the six 
standardized response variables. The structure of the results by country is remarkably similar: 
following the Kaiser-Guttman’s “eigenvalue greater than one” rule,
10
 we find that  k = 2  for all 
countries. For this reason, in the last column of Table 5 we report the cumulative proportion of the 
overall variation explained by the first two principal components (variation “share” for k=2), which is 
remarkably high, always in the 66-75% range.  
Table 5 here 
In the following, we shall use the two factors scores by country, henceforth  f1c t i  and  f2c t i , 
extracted with the principal components factoring. In general, all the results of this paper are robust 
to the use of the other two extraction techniques, principal and maximum likelihood factoring.
11
  
In order to summarize the meaning of f1c t i  and  f2c t i  , we can rely on R
2
 from regressions at the 
country level of each response variable against one factor at a time (either  f1c t i  or  f2c t i  ); the higher 
is R
2
 of each regression, the most relevant is that factor to explain the response variable. Notice that 
this measure contains the same information as the specific factor loading.
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Figure 3 shows the map of the R
2
 of 168 regressions (2 factors times 6 response variables times 14 
countries), sub-divided into six panels (one for each response variable)
13
; each panel reports along the 
y-axis the R
2
 of the country-level regressions of a response variable against  f1c t i , and along the x-axis 
the R
2
 of the regressions against f2c t i .  
Figure 3  here 
                                                          
10 
It can be shown that components with eigenvalues greater than one embody variances greater than the average. 
11
 All unreported are available upon request from the authors, together with the corresponding procedures to implement 
them. 
12
 In fact, when regression procedures are used to estimate the six correlations of each factor with either response 
variable, it can be shown that R
2
 of these regressions are equal to the squared of the corresponding factor loadings. 
Further, the sum of the two R
2
 for the two response variables is equal to their communality, as the two corresponding 
factor scores are orthogonal.   
13
 In the first (second) row of plots there are the variables referring to the economic (political) situation, the three columns 
of plots are ordered from left to right by the timing of the question: past, present and future. 
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A strong, consistent pattern emerges from all these panels. For those in the first column, the 
responses about the past (PASTEC and PASTPOL) are strongly related to  f2c t i , with an  R
2
 on the x-axis of 
about 0.80, while they are almost unrelated to f1c t i , with R
2
 on the y-axis always close to zero.  
Symmetrically in the other four panels, the responses about the present or future (PRESEC and PRESPOL; 
FUTEC and FUTPOL) exhibit the opposite pattern, that is a very strong relation with  f1c t i  and almost no 
relation with f2c t i .  
Accordingly, we suggest that the two factors can be respectively interpreted as: 
f1c t i   summarizes individual responses about the present and the future, in both the economic and 
political dimensions. We shall refer to this as the “forward factor”.  
f2c t i  summarizes individual responses about the past, in both the economic and political dimensions. 
We shall refer to this as the “backward factor”.  
Given the assumption that  Λc  is fixed over time, f1c t i and f2c t i are extracted by putting together all 
surveys for the same country. Therefore, within each country, they (a) have mean zero and standard 
deviation one, and (b) are uncorrelated with one another.  
These features are relevant for our study. First, as we shall explain below, we will focus on these two 
factors as the dependent variables at the center of our analysis. Second, by focusing on how the 
country averages of each country change from year to year (around the full-sample mean of zero) we 
may obtain a preliminary information about how each country-factor changes through time. Third, as 
the two factors are uncorrelated with each other, we may map up to two interpretable summary 
dimensions  for the responses of each individual, which are distinguishable in reference to the time 
horizon (forward vs. backward) but not to their “object” (such as economy versus policy or ideology).  
Fourth, since the two factors are uncorrelated, we expect that the set of potentially explanatory 
variables relevant to the first factor will include variables not relevant to the second factor, and vice 
versa. 
 
3.2 - Macro factors. We now proceed to define the macro factors, which aggregate the individual 
factors in the country dimension.  We could alternatively define them, for each country and time, as 
the unconditional means or medians of the individual factors  f1c t i  and  f2c t i. We first compute the 
country-year means  F1c t  and  F2c t  as defined by:  
  
ct
N
1i
cti
ct
N
fa
Fa
ct
∑
=
=                     (2) 
where  a = 1, 2 identifies the two factors, and Nc t  is the total number of responses in country  c  to 
the  t-th  wave of the survey.  
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The evolution over time and for each country of F1c t  and  F2c t  (and of the respective standard 
deviations) is plotted in Figure 4.  
Figure 4   here 
In order to ascertain whether there is a systematic drift over time in the two factors, we also 
computed the country means of f1c t i  and  f2c t i  for the two periods, before and after 1997, and 
tested whether the change occurring between the two periods is significantly different from zero.  
The relevant data and test statistics (allowing for different variances, since the means in each sub-
period are computed over different numbers of individuals) are reported in Table 6, and the change is 
also plotted in Figure 5. (Note that overall we now have only 81,649 usable observations, as non 
responses reduce the available sample by about 20%).  
Table 6    &   Figure 5   here 
From Table 6 we note that, for all countries taken together, the means of both  f1  and of  f2  
significantly increase from the first to the second period.  More in detail, the change in f1  is positive 
in 9 out of 14 countries, which suggests that in most countries a more favorable assessment of the 
present and future situation is given in the second period. However, this is even more so for the mean 
of f2, where we observe only one negative change (in Belarus), which suggests an overall tendency in 
most other countries to re-assess more positively the communist experience as time moves forward. 
Figure 5 clearly shows that in a relative majority of countries (7 out of 14) there is on average a 
positive revision over time of both responses concerning the past (the backward factor) and the 
present and future (the forward factor).  
For the empirical analysis to follow, however, we prefer to use the country medians, rather than the 
means, as this is more in accord with politico-economic theories about the relevance of median 
preferences. Accordingly we define FM1c t and FM2c t  as the country medians  of the micro factors f1c 
t I  and f2c t i . Notice however that we have performed all the estimations and tests reported below 
also using the country means of each  factor as the dependent variables, and all results are virtually 
identical. 
 
4. A framework for the analysis  
 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to document the causal links that run from macro variables, 
institutions and reforms towards the macro factors which synthesize the median opinion about the 
transition process, which is prevailing in each country-year. How may we link together the stylized 
facts relevant to our story? Here we propose a simple framework to motivate our empirical analysis. 
The process of reform. Consider a country which is pursuing a post-communist transformation, to 
become a democracy and a market economy. The transformation requires adopting a series of 
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reforms, to favor economic restructuring and the growth of output. There are two essential, related 
sources of uncertainty: one is about which reforms are going to be adopted; the other is about the 
outcomes of reforms, once they have been adopted. In general, we may think about the reform 
process in the following way: 
i. Citizens vote for or against a reform (which is by itself a tremendous simplification, as in 
general these choices are mediated by the mechanisms of indirect, representative 
democracy). 
ii. If a majority votes for reforms, it is adopted and implemented (another tremendous 
simplification, as governments are almost never elected on the basis of a single-point 
mandate, and they often end up doing things a bit differently from their electoral programs). 
iii. An adopted reform may succeed or fail to work as expected. There are two grounds for this: 
o Internal reasons for success. Is the design of the reform correct? Did reformers take into 
account or correctly anticipate the consequences of the incentive effects induced by their 
reform? Did they take into account all the necessary mechanisms required to make a 
reform work? For instance, has the relevant information been correctly dispersed? Are the 
needed “reform watchers” (policemen, tax officers, lawyers, etc.) up to their tasks?  
o External reasons. Nature may be of help or unhelpful. Nature refers to other variables in 
the scenario, which the reformers cannot act directly upon or cannot foresee. For instance 
there can be a financial crisis or a negative technology shock or an earthquake. 
It may be argued that to some extent a better (or more cautious) and costlier design of the reform 
package may reduce failures due to natural causes, in practice however we can still attribute some 
failures to bad design and others to bad luck. In any case, although this distinction may be quite 
relevant in practice, we will pursue it only in a very limited way in the empirical analysis, as we cannot 
enter into the details of reform design. 
Two other caveats need to be mentioned at the outset. First, as argued above, as a reform may 
involve many decisions of a potentially complementary nature, reforms may become quite complex. 
Hence when we name a single “reform” (e.g. privatization) in fact we may refer to the whole “reform 
package” that goes (or should ideally go) along with it (e.g. to include a reform of laws governing 
corporate finance and financial markets and intermediaries, and possibly also an insurance system for 
displaced workers, as well as rules related to capital and income flows across borders, and so on). 
Second, we shall not focus on the processes of voting (neither citizens’ vote to nominate their 
parliamentary representatives or the prime minister; nor the elected politicians’ vote to adopt or 
reject reforms). Instead we shall simply focus on how the public opinion (the median citizen) will react 
to the adopted reforms under specific macro and institutional circumstances. Thus we also neglect all 
issues related to the choice or competition between alternative reform proposals or platforms. 
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 Characterization of reforms and of their effects. A reform is a re-organization of existing institutions. 
It is not necessarily costly (in budgetary terms) but it may involve some direct costs (for instance, if it 
requires the construction of infrastructures or to hire new personnel in charge of implementing the 
reform) or also indirect costs (for instance in the case that a costly complementary reform is also 
enacted, possibly in order to provide insurance or subsidies to workers displaced by the main reform). 
Such costs need to be financed, and will reduce (due to increased taxation) the net gains accruing to 
those who benefit from the reform. Before we discuss how this happens, we need to characterize 
incomes before and after the reform. 
We assume that post-communist, pro-market reforms often increase the dispersion of incomes, 
hence worsen the income distribution. This is because in case of a successful reform the income of 
the “winners” increases more, relatively to that of the “losers”. We may thus evaluate each individual 
position after a reform package has been implemented, on the basis of the following representation: 
         YJ =  Y°J + G*+ (GJ + SJ – TJ)               (3) 
where:    
Y°J ; YJ = pre-; post-reform income of individual (or household) J; 
G* = per capita average gain form the reform (> 0 if the reform has been successful, < 0 
otherwise); 
GJ + SJ - TJ = additional individual net benefit from the reform, taking into account the 
individual specific gain GJ ( > 0 if J is winner; ≤ 0 if loser) and the “redistribution package” 
(i.e. balance between the individual subsidy received , SJ , versus tax paid, TJ ), if it is 
included in the reform.
14
   
Ex ante, if required to express an opinion, citizens will vote in favor of a proposed reform package if 
they expect that their net income will increase as a consequence, that is if E(YJ) > Y°J . This will 
depend, for each person, on an assessment of the joint distribution of the mean and the individual 
specific gains, and on the net effect of the expected compensatory measures. However, we are more 
concerned here with how that same citizen will react, after a reform has been implemented: again, 
this will depend on: (i) whether the reform has been successful on average, (ii) whether the specific 
position of that citizen with respect to the reform turns out to be that of a winner or a loser; (iii) 
whether the redistribution package enacted with the reform has provided net benefits for losers. The 
importance of (iii) must be stressed, in view of the assumption that reforms generally worsen the 
income distribution, even when they are successful. Thus, also in the case of a successful reform it will 
often be necessary to provide sufficient compensations to losers, in order to make reforms ex post 
agreeable to a majority of the population, and in particular to prevent a reform reversal. 
                                                          
14
  If GJ > 0, then we might expect SJ - TJ < 0, to the extent that some redistribution takes place between winners and 
losers. 
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Empirical implications. Summing up, the framework presented so far suggests that the adoption of 
transitional reforms should be followed by an increase in the dispersion of incomes, and possibly also 
by a contemporaneous increase of average income levels (depending on the greater or lesser success 
of the reform). Also, a reform package may or may not include some measures of ex post 
redistribution between winners and losers, depending on the extent to which policy makers’ choices 
are motivated by a desire to avoid the worsening of income distribution. 
Depending on these factors (the success or failure of the reform, the design of the reform package, 
and thus the existence and size of possible redistribution effects) a majority of the people will express 
either an increase, or a decrease in their overall satisfaction with the reform process. This would then 
show up as an increase in the macro factor FM1ct , which synthesizes the median opinion prevailing in 
each country-year towards the present and future of the transition process. Similarly, a dissatisfaction 
with the outcomes of the process might also show up as an increase in the macro factor FM2ct , which 
synthesizes the median opinion prevailing in each country-year towards the past (communist) 
economic and political system. 
In accord with this framework, we have selected as potential explanatory variables a set of macro and 
institutional indicators, which describe both the extent and characteristics of the reforms adopted 
during the post-communist transformation and the state of the macro economy. These variables are 
meant to measure the extent of the reform process, the possible complementarity (or lack of) 
between the reforms adopted, and the macroeconomic context and consequences of those reforms.  
 
5. The macro drivers of the macro factors 
  
In this section we report the results of our search for the main determinants (drivers) of the two 
“macro” factors, measured by the country-year medians FM1c t and FM2c t. In the previews section we 
suggested that reforms are identified by their “extent”, which we can generically measure with the 
share of output provided by the private sector, and on the “packaging” of each reform (which is 
defined as the set of ancillary or accompanying reforms, which are meant either to facilitate the 
smooth working of the main reform, or to insure or compensate the “losers”). We also argued that 
the success or failure of a reform may depend on several factors, among which is the possibility of 
adverse macro events, which may be due to the reforms themselves or be entirely exogenous. Hence, 
in the same spirit of that section, we select here the following potential determinants for the two 
macro factors which we have identified: 
• the first and the second moment of the set of nine EBRD transition indicators (TI
m
c t and TI
v
c t 
respectively)
15
;  
                                                          
15
 The second moment is introduced to measure the dispersion of reforms: if reforms are pursued according to a 
homogenous  pattern, taking their complementarities in full account, than the variance of reform indicators should be 
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• a vector MACc t , which in turn includes the following four macroeconomic variables: g c t (growth 
rate of GDP), inflc t (annual inflation rate), Uc t (unemployment rate), Gic t  (Gini index of inequality 
of the earnings distribution) ; 
• PSc t (share of the private sector in GDP) ; 
The general empirical functional form is assumed to be a distributed-lags panel model with two-way 
(country  µc  and time  τt  ) fixed effects.  Given that we have extracted individual factor scores at the 
country level, it is appropriate to use the fixed effects (within) estimator, as it ignores the variation 
between countries, with which we cannot deal in the context of this section. In addition, Verbeek and 
Nijman (1992) show the consistency of the within estimator in pseudo panels like ours, where the 
number of individuals per cohort (cell) is very large (see the counts in Table 2). 
We also assume that the determinants identified above may also interact in a number of ways, as 
exemplified in equation (4) below: 
tcatcatcpa
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 for  a = 1, 2   (4) 
where:    
FMac t , a = 1,2 is defined as the median of the micro factor faict within each country-year cluster;  
α(L),  γ(L),  ϕ(L)  and  φ(L)  are polynomials in the lag operator up to the second order;  the β 
parameters measure the interaction effects;  and we have introduced possible interactions 
between the Transition Indicators (TI
m
ct and TI
v
ct) and the macroeconomic variables (MACct), and 
between the latter and the share of the private sector, PSct.  Notice that the parameters of 
equation (3) are specific to each of the two factors.  
The random shocks εact with a = 1, 2  are assumed to be independently distributed over time, but 
possibly heteroskedastic; for this, we adjust the fixed-affects standard error panel estimates to 
account for general heteroskedasticity, see White (1980). 
Note that equation (4) reports a general model, allowing for all linear interactions between the 
macroeconomic and the transition variables.
16
 In this setup we can easily test the validity of more 
restricted specifications. For instance, if we were to assume that βam = βav = βap = 0, this implies 
setting all the interaction terms equal to zero.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
minimal. See Staher (2005) for a wider discussion of the concept of complementarity and Braga De Macedo and Oliveira 
Martins (2008), who use the standard deviation of reform indicators with the same purpose as here. Also notice that 
the results reported in the text are robust to the use of the Herfindhal concentration index of the nine EBRD indicators 
instead of their standard deviations TI
v
c t . See the Data Appendix for more information on the data. 
16
  The limited number of observations prevents the inclusion of the square terms that would be included if the equation 
were to be interpreted as a 2nd order approximation. 
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In Tables 7 and 8 we report the sequence of general-to-specific models that have been estimated 
from the general framework of equation (4), respectively for the first (F1) and second (F2) factors. In 
each case the dependent variable is defined as the median response within each country-year 
cluster.
17
 
Tables 7 and 8  here 
The first two columns in both Tables report the corresponding data congruent reductions of the 
general model, respectively without (column 1) and with (column 2) the inclusion of interaction 
terms: the F statistics reported in the bottom lines never reject the corresponding restrictions. 
Estimation results suggest that the interaction terms in column (2) make the time dummy of column 
(1) redundant. While parameters in column (2) of both tables are still imprecisely estimated because 
of multicollinearity, this specification is preferable to that of column (1), as it may be improved by 
economically meaningful restrictions.  The final models for F1  and F2 are reported in column (3) of 
Tables 7 and 8 respectively. The chosen specification for F1 has been reduced to only four explanatory 
variables (three of which interacted terms) in addition to the 14 country effects; that for F2 contains 
only three interacted terms in addition to the country effects. The two final models which have 
emerged from the reduction of equations (4) are summarized  in the following equations:
18
 
  FM1c t  = µ1 c + α1 [(TImc  t + 1) × g c  t] + α2 [TImc t × U c t ] + α3 [TIvc t × g c t] + ε 1 c t  (5) 
 FM2c t  =  µ2 c + β1 [Gini c,  t-2 × PS c t ] + β2 [Infl c,  t-2 × PS c t ] +  ε 2 c t      (6) 
We immediately notice that the explanatory variables for the two factors are completely different. 
This is essentially coherent with F1 and F2 being orthogonal by construction. We acknowledge that in 
practice these two factors have been identified only on the basis of a statistical decomposition, hence 
our results should not be interpreted as suggesting any kind of schizophrenic decision process; they 
may instead be interpreted as suggesting the usefulness of our method of classifying the independent 
variables on the basis of whether they are used for making assessments of the present and future or 
of the past.  We also notice that interaction effects are largely dominant in both equations, and they 
are “correctly” signed according to our expectations: 
• For FM1 (the forward factor) the “median opinion” expressed by the individuals interviewed in 
each country and time is influenced by the interaction between the state of reforms (average and 
variance of the reform indicator) and the state of the macro economy (g and U). 
                                                          
17
 Estimates with average values are very similar to those with median values.  
18
 These equations also contain a change in notation, as the α now refer to the coefficients in the equation for FM1, and 
the  β to that for FM2. A note of caution is required when looking at these results, as the limited number of 
observations in the time dimension (only about six waves of interviews per country on average) may have weakened 
the efficiency of the testing procedure. 
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• Progress in transitional reforms (measured by an increase in the average level of the transition 
indicators ) affects positively the median opinion about the present and the future. A positive 
growth rate adds to this positive effect  (α1 positive), while an increase in unemployment detracts 
from it (α2 negative).
19
 
• We notice a marked negative effect of not exploiting the complementarity of reforms, which is 
also reinforced by a stronger GDP growth (α3 negative): this possibly suggests that faster growth 
increases the perceived urgency of a well-balanced reform package.  
• For FM2 (the backward factor) results are driven by three macroeconomic variables which mostly 
affect negatively the welfare of the losers (and thus increase their “nostalgia” for the past): the 
rate of inflation, the worsening distribution of earnings and an increasing share of the private 
sector.  
• The first two variables enter through an interaction with the third one (the share of the private 
sector in GDP). Our interpretation is that privatization is perceived to have negative effects (and to 
increase “nostalgia” for the past) insofar as it is observed together with a worsening of inflation or 
of the distribution of incomes.
20 
  
• No measure of transition reforms  seems to affect the evaluation of the past.  
To validate the robustness of these results, we conduct two different tests of specification. The first 
test follows from the procedure adopted by Rovelli and Zaiceva (2011), who argue that “statements 
about the past and the present are not independent of each other, but rather reinforce each other”. 
To take this into account they compute the dependent variables by taking the difference (or 
“distance”) between evaluations about the present and the past. In the same spirit, we compute a 
new dependent variable, defined as the difference between the forward and the backward factors, 
FM1 and FM2 respectively. We model this variable following the same specification strategy reported 
in Tables 7 and 8. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the results of the new specification search are coherent 
with those reported in those tables: we end up with a set of explanatory variables equal to the union 
of the two sets of variables included in column (3) of Table 7 and 8; also the new estimated 
coefficients are almost identical (within one standard deviation) to the original ones (apart from the 
obvious change of sign for the explanatory variables of FM2).
21
 
                                                          
19
 In these regressions we have only used TI
m
 (average) and TI
v
 (standard deviation) of the nine transition indicators. In 
principle it would be interesting to explore the role of each single indicator, but this is discouraged by the high 
correlation between them. In the correlation matrix of all the TI measures relevant to our sample, the minimum bi-
variate correlation is 0.64 (between indicators of price and financial market liberalization), while all the other values are 
above 0.7, and some as high as 0.92 (between bank and infrastructure reforms). Hence we do not pursue this analysis. 
20
 Note that in the equation for FM2 both Gini and Inflation enter with a 2-year lag. Lags are defined as the number of 
solar years before the relevant survey year. 
21
 We do not report these results to save space, they are available if requested. 
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A second test of our specification looks how appropriate it is to assume that countries differ only by 
their specific fixed effects. In Table 10 we thus report the results of the tests for predictive failure, 
conducted by re-estimating the chosen models for FM1 and FM2, excluding from each one country at 
a time. Out of 28 tests, we observe a predictive failure at 10% only in 5 cases, and never at 1%. The 
result of these tests thus strongly supports the poolability of the different countries into a single 
model.  This validates the modeling choice which we have adopted so far (based on the idea that the 
same macro-institutional variables could explain changes in people’s judgments across time for all 
countries). However, this result also suggests another way of exploiting or rather building on this 
result, which we pursue in the next session. 
Table 9 here 
 
6. The institutional drivers of the country effects 
 
In the previous section, we explored the determinants of the median opinion, within each country 
and across time. To this purpose, we measured each pair of factors independently for each country. 
This implies that, on the average of all individual responses for each country, each factor averages to 
zero.
22
  As we have validated the poolability of our model across countries (see Table 9 and comments 
in the previous section), we are now tempted to “pool” also the extraction of the two factors. We 
anticipate that this more restrictive procedure will be validated below, and this result will allow us to 
conduct a meaningful analysis of the differences between the country fixed effects. 
As a first step, we re-compute the principal components for the six  basic response variables for the 
overall sample (all countries and all years), that is across 81,649 individual observations.  Almost 
identically to the previous analysis, the first two components explain 72% of the overall variance.  Of 
the two, the first component (which we  now call w1i c t) is again related mainly to four of the 
response variables, those focused on the present or future (PRESEC and PRESPOL; FUTEC and FUTPOL), and 
the second component (w2i c t) is related to the other two responses, focused on the past (PASTEC and 
PASTPOL). The R
2
 of the regressions of the responses on the factors are all above 0.77 for w1i c t and 
around 0.90 for w2i c t.
23
 
As a second step, we compute the median values of the micro factors w1i c t and w2i c t  within each 
country-year cluster; these are defined respectively as WM1c t and WM2c t.  These are the new 
dependent variables, for a “macro” regression model, analogous to that reported in Tables 7 and 8 
above. We perform the same procedure of general to specific reductions, which leads to a new set of 
                                                          
22 
Although strictly speaking the medians are not constrained to become zero in each country-year cluster, it is clear that 
this procedures also obscures a source of differences between the country-year medians. 
23
 These numbers can be compared with those reported in section 3.1 and in Figure 3. 
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estimates, almost identical to those reported in columns (3) of Tables 7 and 8. We  report the final 
results of this procedure, in Tables 10 and 11 respectively. In all cases, the results are striking: 
independently of whether we have computed each factor on a country base (as for f1, f2) or over the 
whole sample (as for w1, w2) the difference between the two sets of computations is reflected 
almost only in the estimates of the fixed effects, whereas the selection of the other regressors and 
the values and significance of all individual coefficients are very similar. To ease this comparison, in 
column (1) of Tables 10 and 11 we reproduce the final estimates from column (3) of Tables 7 and 8 
respectively, adding however the individual fixed effects, which we had not shown before. In column 
(2) of Tables 10 and 11 we show the same regression as in column (1),  but using the dependent 
variable computed over the whole sample: in each case the difference between estimates in columns 
(1) and (2) is clearly limited to the estimates of the fixed effects.
24, 25
 This is remarkable, as it suggests 
that country fixed effects can be explained on the basis of variables, which are different from those 
already included in Tables 7 and 8 and which apparently capture the variability of the dependent 
variable only in the time dimension.  
Tables 10 and 11 here 
How than could we capture variability in the spatial dimension? To this purpose, we search for 
different explanatory variables; we focus in particular on measures of cross-country institutional 
differences.
26
 In Figures 6, 7 and 8 we plot the visual correlations of four such variables with the 
estimated country fixed effects (from columns (2) of Tables 10 and 11 respectively). In particular we 
observe:  
(i) a strong positive correlation between the estimated country fixed effect from the equation for 
WM1 (the “forward” factor) and  the indicators of  Rule of Law and Control of Corruption
27
;  
(ii) and (ii) a strong positive (negative) correlation between the estimated country fixed effect 
from the equation for WM2 (the “backward” factor) and  the Mortality Rate (Life Expectancy) 
indicators.
28
 
                                                          
24
 Note that the adjusted R-squares are not comparable between columns (1) and (2), because of the difference in their 
method of computation.  
25
 As we explained previously, the country-averages of the factors computed at the country level are all zero by 
construction. 
26
 We considered in particular six World Bank Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. In addition we included also Adult 
Mortality and Life Expectancy from the WDI. See the Data Appendix. For each indicator we used the country average for 
the available time periods.  
27
 The sample correlation between the estimated country fixed effects from the model in Table 10 and the Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption indicators is respectively: 0.81; 0.79. The correlation between the two indicators is 0.98 (based on 
14 country averages). 
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Insert Figures 6 and 7  here 
These patterns of correlations are quite plausible, as it is natural to expect that the opinion of the 
median (or average) citizen about the post-communist experience (and the adopted reforms) should 
be strongly influenced in each country by the four indicators reported above. More precisely, 
evaluations about the present and the future (embodied in factor f1, and hence in WM1) are affected 
by the strength and well-functioning of the institutional environment (measured by indicators of the 
Rule of Law or Control of Corruption) while “nostalgia” for the past (embodied in factor f2, and hence 
in WM2)  is enhanced by indicators of ill-functioning of the present system (such as an increase in the 
rate of mortality or a decrease in life expectancy).  
The next task is to insert these indicators in the relevant regressions. Results are reported in columns 
(3) and (4) of Tables 10 and 11. In each column, we have also deleted the fixed effects which are no 
longer significantly different from zero after the inclusion of the new variables. Consider for instance 
column (3) of Table 10. With the inclusion of Rule of Law (which has a strong significant positive effect 
on WM1), the goodness of fit improves (as measured by smaller RMSE), the  main explanatory 
variables retain their values and significance, and most of the country effects disappear (that is, they 
become insignificantly different from that of Hungary, the country on which we had parametrised the 
constant term in columns (1) and (2)).  In fact the only remaining country effects are those for 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia, all of which are significantly positive: this implies that in 
these four countries the satisfaction for the post-communist experience goes beyond the positive 
effects of the improved Rule of Law. On the other hand it is noteworthy that the strong negative 
country effect for Russia reported in column (2) entirely disappears when the (lack of ) Rule of Law is 
introduced in the equation. 
Almost identical remarks can be made for the introduction of Control of Corruption in column (4) of 
Table 10. In fact these two indicators (Rule of Law and Control of Corruption) are strongly correlated 
with each other hence their explanatory power is similar in all respects. 
Two other indicators (Mortality and Life Expectancy) perform similar roles in Table 11, columns (3) 
and (4), although now the number of vanishing country fixed effects is smaller (about half of the 
countries).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
28
 The sample correlation between the estimated country fixed effects from the model in Table 11 and the Mortality Rate 
and Life Expectancy indicators is respectively: 0.67; -0.63. The correlation between the two indicators is -0.97 (based on 
14 country averages). 
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7. Summing up and conclusions 
 
Although the experience of the post-communist transition has been broadly successful, numerous 
signs of “transition fatigue” and of nostalgia for the previous regime have also appeared. Our purpose 
in this paper has been to assess how the post-communist transformations have affected the peoples’ 
perceptions of their economic and political systems. In particular, we have sought to identify the 
macro and institutional drivers of the (median) public opinion. For this purpose, we have transformed 
the individual data, originated with the surveys conducted by the New Democracy Barometers from 
1991 to 2004, into an aggregate macro pseudo-panel, with 89 country-year clusters, based on 13 
countries observed during that period.  
We have used factor analysis to summarize the available data. In fact, our intermediate findings imply 
that the overall variability of responses across individuals, countries and time is adequately 
summarized by only two factors, which jointly explain between 66% and 75% of the overall variability.  
We also find that, for all countries in our sample, (i) responses about the present and future are very 
closely related, and different from those about the past; (ii) at any point in time, responses about the 
polity are closely related to those about the economy.  
These intermediate results have allowed us to conduct our macro analysis by focusing on only two 
macro (aggregate) factors, which can be intuitively interpreted as representing, respectively, the 
median opinion about the present and future state of the economic and political system, and the 
median opinion about the past. We have then modeled how these opinions have been shaped by 
institutional and macro variables. Our results in this respect are quite robust and amenable to a clear 
interpretation. A synthetic summary of the results is that:  
i. When the economy is growing, on average people appreciate more extensive reforms; they 
dislike unbalanced reforms.  
ii. Nostalgia for the previous regime is heightened by increasing inequality in the distribution of 
incomes and by higher inflation. In particular, the effects of both variables come through an 
interaction with increases in the private sector share in GDP: in a way, this suggests that 
people attribute to private capitalism the cause of both a worsening income distribution and 
higher prices. 
iii. Cross-country differences in the attitudes towards the present and future are largely explained 
by differences in the institutional indicators for the rule of law and corruption.  
iv. Cross-country differences in the extent of nostalgia towards the past are mainly related to 
differences in the deterioration of standards of living. 
In our view, these results have also clear policy implications, as they underlay the importance of 
exploiting reform complementarity and of ensuring the inclusiveness of the reform outcomes. Also, 
 23 
 
they are a useful reminder that institutional quality and good governance are essential ingredients of 
successful reforms. 
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Data Appendix  
Individual (survey) data  
Sources: New Europe Barometer (waves I-VII), New Russia Barometer (waves I-XIII) and New Baltic Barometer 
(waves I-VI). These data have been produced by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Aberdeen/University of Strathclyde, sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research, 
Austrian National Bank and Paul Lazarsfeld Society (Vienna), as well as by the Centre for the Study of Public 
Policy, Bank of Sweden, Tercentenary Foundation, Economic and Social Research Council, MacArthur 
Foundation (Chicago), and supplied by the UK Data Archive. The data are Crown copyright. The original data 
creators, depositors or copyright holders, and the UK Data Archive bear no responsibility for the present 
analysis or interpretation of these data.  
The following data were obtained directly from the UK Data Archive: 
Rose, R., New Europe Barometer I-V, 1991-1998 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive 
[distributor], October 2005. SN: 5241. 
Rose, R., New Europe Barometer VI, 2001 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
October 2005. SN: 5242.  
Rose, R., Mishler, William, New Europe Barometer VII, 2004-2005 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK 
Data Archive [distributor], July 2007. SN: 5243.  
Rose, R., New Russia Barometer, 2000-2001 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive 
[distributor], November 2003. SN: 4550.  
Rose, R., New Russia Barometer XIII, 2004 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
August 2007. SN: 5700.  
The data listed above have been coded into a single dataset as described by Rovelli and Zaiceva (2009). 
Macroeconomic variables and institutional and reform indicators 
• GDP growth rate. GDP per capita PPP (constant 2000 international USD, annual rate of growth)). Source: 
World Development Indicators (WDI, http://econ.worldbank.org/).  
• Inflation.  GDP deflator (annual rate). Source: WDI.  
• Unemployment rate. Source: EBRD. (For Belarus: IMF International Financial Statistics; for Estonia in 1990 
and 1991 and for Ukraine: WDI,) 
• Gini index for the distribution of earnings. Source: Transmonee dataset, release 2008, 
http://www.transmonee.org/. Missing data have been interpolated using the Gini index for the distribution 
of incomes were available, or linearly otherwise. 
• Private sector share in GDP. Source: EBRD online data table-Structural Change Indicators 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm. 
• EBRD Transition Indicators . Source: EBRD (2007b). 
• World Bank Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp): Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of 
Corruption (for each indicator, average of values for 1996-2004).  
• Adult Mortality  Rate (Total deaths per 1000 adults). Source: WDI (average 1991-2004). 
• Life Expectancy at Birth (Number of years). Source: WDI (average 1991-2004). 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.      Correlations among responses which also involve judgments about the past 
a
 
 
a
 Each country is represented by the code number, see the first column of Table2. 
Figure 2.     Correlations among responses which do not involve judgments about the past 
a
 
 
a
 See the footnote to Figure 1. 
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Figure 3.  Explanatory power of each factor by response variable 
a, b
 
 
a
   Explanatory power is measured by the R
2
 from country-level regressions of each response variable against one 
factor at a time. Along the y-axes we report the R
2
 of the regressions against  f1c,t,i ; along the x-axes the R
2
 of the 
regressions against  f2c,t,i . 
b
  The first (second) row of plots the R
2
 from regressions where the dependent variables are the responses relative 
to the economic (political) situation, the three columns refer respectively to responses about the past, present 
and future. Within each plot, each point refers to the R
2 
 for a country regression (country codes 1-14 are 
reported in the first column of Table 2. 
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Figure  4.     Time patterns of mean and standard deviation of F1 (above) and F2 (below), by country
 a
 
 
a
 Each dot corresponds to a surveyed year, data gaps are interpolated within country. Overall, there are 89 dots, 
corresponding to the 89 country-year clusters in Table 2. By construction each country mean and standard 
deviation across all periods are respectively zero and one. 
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Figure 5. Average changes in the score of f1 and f2  in each country: before/after 1997 
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Figure 6 – Correlation between country fixed effects for WM1 and two institutional variables: 
(a) Rule of Law     (b) Control of Corruption 
 
 
Figure 7 – Correlation between country fixed effects for WM2 and two institutional variables: 
(a) Mortality Rate     (b) Life Expectancy at Birth 
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Table 1.  The six basic questions and corresponding answer codes 
Here is a scale for ranking how 
the economic system works 
Here is a scale for ranking how 
our system of government works 
The top, plus 100, is the best; the bottom, minus 100, the worst. 
Where on this scale would you put: 
PASTEC:  
the Socialist economic system before 
the revolution of 1989   
 PRESPOL: the former Communist regime  
PRESEC: our current economic system     PRESPOL: 
our current system of governing with free 
elections and many parties °    
 FUTEC: our economic system in five years time  FUTPOL: 
our system of governing five years in the 
future                                            
° This question is phrased differently in some countries, e.g. in Russia. 
 
 
Table 2.   The NEB Surveys: Sample dimension by country and time  
Year: 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2004 Total % share 
Code. Country:            
1. Bulgaria 1002 1164 1139 1181  971  1163 1231 7851 7.7 
2. Czech R. 660 1275 1103 908  961  1101 967 6975 6.8 
3. Slovakia 291 569 531 1010  923  1002 1036 5362 5.2 
4. Hungary 923 864 971 1018  973  1577 990 7316 7.1 
5. Poland 1130 1063 980 949  1141  1000 943 7206 7.0 
6. Romania 986 999 1000 996  1192  1001 1110 7284 7.1 
7. Croatia  1000 1000 1000  1000    4000 3.9 
8. Slovenia 1049 1011 984 997  974  1098 1000 7113 6.9 
9. Belarus  1222 1056 1000  1000   1000 5278 5.2 
10. Ukraine  993 945 1000  1161   2000 6099 6.0 
11. Russia  2106 1973 1951 2374 1904 1907 2000 2068 16283 15.9 
12. Estonia   1987 1296 971  1048 943 940 7185 7.0 
13. Latvia   2137 1173 952  966 1001 956 7185 7.0 
14. Lithuania   2012 870 1000  1112 1124 1113 7231 7.1 
Total 6041 12266 17818 15349 5297 12200 5033 13010 15354 102368 100.0 
% share 5.9 12.0 17.4 15.0 5.2 11.9 4.9 12.7 15.0 100.0  
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Table 3. Basic statistics, whole sample 
   Past         Present        Future 
Variables: PASTEC PASTPOL PRESEC PRESPOL FUTEC FUTPOL 
Observations 95749 94126 97199 95474 89439 87081 
(% of non-reponses) (6.5) (8.1) (5.0) (6.7) (12.6) (14.9) 
Mean 22.94 3.72 -14.17 2.83 18.69 26.76 
Std. Dev. 54.99 60.24 50.14 50.67 49.67 47.41 
Sources of heterogeneity across means of country-year clusters, % shares 
a
 
- country effect 68.0 62.0 44.6 51.2 37.9 39.2 
- time effect 8.9 18.3 19.9 6.5 11.2 10.5 
- residual effect 23.1 19.7 35.5 42.3 50.9 50.3 
Sources of heterogeneity across standard deviations of country-year clusters, % shares 
a
 
- country effect 56.9 51.6 32.8 24.8 26.2 27.3 
- time effect 4.1 6.5 10.0 13.9 12.2 19.4 
- residual effect 39.0 41.9 57.2 61.3 61.6 53.3 
a
 The variability between countries and over time is decomposed in three shares: the first 
(country) is explained by differences across countries, the second (time) by a time-varying 
drift common to all countries (“time effect”); the residual effect captures idiosyncratic 
factors.  
 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix using all available data 
a
 
 PASTEC PASTPOL PRESEC PRESPOL FUTEC FUTPOL 
PASTEC 1      
PASTPOL 0.635 1     
PRESEC -0.162 -0.141 1    
PRESPOL -0.157 -0.198 0.537 1   
FUTEC -0.145 -0.173 0.622 0.472 1  
FUTPOL -0.149 -0.193 0.419 0.684 0.645 1 
  a
 1% significant pairwise correlation coefficients are reported in bold. 
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Table 5.  Principal components analysis by country 
Eigenvalue: 
a
 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 Variation share 
explained by λ1+ λ1 b Code. country:       
1. Bulgaria 2.865 1.246 0.779 0.545 0.313 0.251 0.685 
2. Czech R. 3.308 1.352 0.526 0.355 0.312 0.148 0.777 
3. Slovakia 3.019 1.485 0.599 0.405 0.344 0.147 0.751 
4. Hungary 2.810 1.625 0.578 0.467 0.357 0.162 0.739 
5. Poland 3.011 1.436 0.694 0.373 0.321 0.165 0.741 
6. Romania 2.500 1.519 0.872 0.499 0.387 0.223 0.670 
7. Croatia 2.712 1.604 0.670 0.514 0.311 0.188 0.719 
8. Slovenia 2.569 1.565 0.690 0.512 0.446 0.218 0.689 
9. Belarus 2.449 1.527 0.699 0.571 0.473 0.281 0.663 
10. Ukraine 2.784 1.369 0.652 0.539 0.437 0.219 0.692 
11. Russia 2.668 1.582 0.659 0.547 0.349 0.195 0.708 
12. Estonia 2.868 1.460 0.682 0.434 0.377 0.179 0.721 
13. Latvia 2.813 1.475 0.734 0.439 0.387 0.152 0.715 
14. Lithuania 2.864 1.382 0.659 0.489 0.433 0.172 0.708 
a
  Ordered eigenvalues of the empirical covariance matrix of the p=6 variables of interest. 
b
  Cumulative proportion of the overall variation explained by the first two principal components. 
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Table 6.  Comparison between country averages of f1 and f2 before/after 1997 
a
 
 
No. 
Obs. 
Average of f1 
 
Average of f2 
 
Code & country  
1991- 
1996 
1998-
2004 change 
a
 
 
1991- 
1996 
1998-
2004 change 
a
 
 
1 Bulgaria 7148 -0.013 0.016 0.029 
 
-0.089 0.113 0.202 
*** 
2 Czech R. 5905 0.133 -0.237 -0.370 
*** 
-0.004 0.007 0.011 
 
3 Slovakia 4537 0.193 -0.194 -0.387 
*** 
0.017 -0.017 -0.034 
 
4 Hungary 4681 -0.180 0.231 0.411 
*** 
0.010 -0.013 -0.024 
 
5 Poland 5237 -0.068 0.109 0.177 
*** 
-0.079 0.127 0.205 
*** 
6 Romania 6731 0.126 -0.174 -0.300 
*** 
-0.117 0.162 0.279 
*** 
7 Croatia 3999 0.115 -0.346 -0.461 
*** 
-0.076 0.230 0.306 
*** 
8 Slovenia 6008 0.040 -0.050 -0.091 
*** 
-0.240 0.299 0.539 
*** 
9 Belarus 4392 -0.234 0.423 0.657 
*** 
0.069 -0.124 -0.193 
*** 
10 Ukraine 4259 -0.225 0.238 0.463 
*** 
-0.101 0.106 0.207 
*** 
11Russia 15569 -0.201 0.218 0.420 
*** 
-0.165 0.179 0.344 
*** 
12 Estonia 4503 -0.104 0.147 0.251 
*** 
-0.058 0.082 0.140 
*** 
13 Latvia 3488 -0.090 0.118 0.208 
*** 
-0.105 0.139 0.244 
*** 
14 Lithuania 5192 -0.057 0.042 0.099 
*** 
-0.083 0.061 0.144 
*** 
 Total 81649 -0.047 0.062 0.109 
*** 
-0.086 0.111 0.197 
*** 
a 
Changes which are 1% significant are marked with *** on the basis of heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 7. Panel within estimates 
a
 of the macro drivers : Factor F1 
Explanatory variables: (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
TI
m
c, t -1.8628 
* 
-0.8416 
 
 
 
 (1.118) 
 
(0.666) 
 
 
 
TI
v
c, t 1.1611 
 
-0.9095 
 
 
 
 (1.027) 
 
(1.023) 
 
 
 
U c, t -0.0310 
** 
-0.0198 
 
 
 
 (0.015) 
 
(0.045) 
 
 
 
g c, t 0.0217 
*** 
0.0876 
*** 
0.0612 
*** 
 (0.007) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.012) 
 
TI
m
c,, t × g c, t  
 
0.0409 
 
0.0612 
*** 
  
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.012) 
 
TI
m
c, t × u c, t  
 
-0.0053 
 
-0.0386 
** 
  
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.016) 
 
TI
v
c, t  × g c, t  
 
-0.4388 
*** 
-0.3854 
*** 
  
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.088) 
 
 µc b 1.0988 ** 0.9544 * 0.2697 ** 
 (0.417) 
 
(0.539) 
 
(0.109) 
 
τt joint significance test 
c
 0.0010 
 
no 
 
no  
R2_adj 0.3806 
 
0.3543 
 
0.3614 
 
Std. error of regression 0.2512 
 
0.2548 
 
0.2523 
 
No. estimated parameters 
d
 26 
 
21 
 
17 
 
F test for restrictions 
e
 0.6520 
 
0.5648 
 
0.4773 
 
Legenda:  
a 
Model is specified as unbalanced panel of N × T observations (N × T = 89) from 1991 to 2004 for N countries (N = 14), on 
average each country belongs to the panel for T = 6.34 years. OLS estimates with fixed effects (within). White (1980) 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity reported in brackets below coefficient estimates. 
 
***
 = 1% significant, 
**
 = 5% significant, and 
*
 10% significant. 
b
  µc : average of the individual (country) fixed effects. 
c
  When time dummies τt are present, the p-values of the F test for the joint τt = 0 hypothesis are reported. 
d
 Including non-reported estimates of the fixed effects and of the time dummies (if present).  
e 
In each column we report the p-value of the joint parameters restrictions which lead to the specific model of that column. In 
column (1) restrictions are those imposed on the general model of eq. (4) without interaction terms; in column (2) 
restrictions are those imposed on the general model of eq. (4) with interactions; in column (3) restrictions are from the 
model of column (2). 
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Table 8. Panel within estimates 
a
 of the macro drivers : Factor F2 
Explanatory variables: (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Infl c, t-2 0.0089 
*** 
0.0000 
 
 
 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.026) 
 
 
 
PS c, t -0.0003 
 
0.0031 
 
 
 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.007) 
 
 
 
Gini c, t-2 2.1057 
*** 
1.6336 
 
 
 
 (0.680) 
 
(1.300) 
 
 
 
PS c, t × Infl c, t-2  
 
0.0176 
 
0.0202 
*** 
  
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.006) 
 
PS c, t × Gini c, t-2  
 
0.5156 
 
2.0629 
*** 
  
 
(2.144) 
 
(0.306) 
 
Average µc b -0.8552 *** -0.6769 * -0.2616 *** 
 (0.220) 
 
(0.375) 
 
(0.052) 
 
τt joint significance 
c
 0.0023 
 
no 
 
no 
 
R2_adj 0.4419 
 
0.3650 
 
0.3749 
 
Std. error of regression 0.1984 
 
0.2101 
 
0.2078 
 
No. estimated parameters 
d
 25 
 
19 
 
16 
 
F test for restrictions 
e
 0.2540 
 
7856 
 
0.5373 
 
Legenda:  See Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 9. Test of parameter constancy: excluding one country at a time  
Specification from: 
Col (3) of  
Table 7 
Col (3) of  
Table 8 
Dependent variable: F1 F2 
Excluded Country:   
1  - Bulgaria 0.5011 0.6918 
2  - Czech Republic 0.9483 0.2059 
3  - Slovakia 0.6356 0.3176 
4  - Hungary 0.6759 0.1641 
5  - Poland 0.2149 0.0907 
6  - Romania 0.1556 0.9026 
7  - Croatia 0.5384 0.3479 
8  - Slovenia 0.6721 0.0180 
9  - Belarus 0.2269 0.0945 
10 - Ukraine 0.0712 0.6277 
11 - Russia 0.3207 0.8588 
12 - Estonia 0.7014 0.7021 
13 - Latvia 0.8267 0.3656 
14 - Lithuania 0.0508 0.4958 
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Table 10. Panel estimates of the macro drivers: whole-sample factor WM1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: FM1 
 
WM1 
 
WM1 
 
WM1 
Explanatory variables: 
g c, t 0.0612 *** 0.0592 *** 0.0584 *** 0.0575 *** 
 0.0119 0.0119 0.0103 0.0103   
TI
m
c,, t × g c, t 0.0612 *** 0.0592 *** 0.0584 *** 0.0575 *** 
 0.0119 0.0119 0.0103 0.0103   
TI
m
c, t × u c, t -0.0386 ** -0.0369 ** -0.0370 *** -0.0343 *** 
 0.0163 0.0159 0.0102 0.0098   
TI
v
c, t  × g c, t -0.3854 *** -0.3697 *** -0.3596 *** -0.3556 *** 
 0.0880 0.0875 0.0758 0.0758   
Rule of Law 0.2220 ***   
0.0573   
Control of Corruption 0.2442 *** 
0.0647   
_cons 0.1880 0.2925 * 0.1876 ** 0.1892 ** 
0.1615 0.1524 0.0757 0.0739   
Bulgaria 0.0893 0.0668 0.2060 *** 0.2084 *** 
0.1220 0.1138 0.0726 0.0716   
Czech R. 0.0123 0.3651 ** 0.3043 *** 0.3663 *** 
0.1515 0.1419 0.1071 0.1017   
Slovakia 0.2022 0.0734 — —   
0.1334 0.1285   
Hungary — — — — 
Poland 0.2075 0.2507 * 0.2434 *** 0.2378 *** 
0.1355 0.1255 0.0883 0.0865   
Romania 0.0691 -0.0076 — —   
0.1626 0.1481   
Croatia 0.0645 -0.2194 — —   
0.1513 0.1409   
Slovenia 0.0033 0.0872 — —   
0.1553 0.1461   
Belarus 0.0485 -0.2587 — —   
0.1852 0.1708   
Ukraine 0.0765 -0.4020 — —   
0.2582 0.2680   
Russia 0.0810 -0.3592 *** — —   
0.1435 0.1352   
Estonia 0.0359 0.3823 *** 0.3364 *** 0.3153 *** 
0.1270 0.1179 0.0740 0.0757   
Latvia 0.1403 -0.0170 — —   
0.1340 0.1244   
Lithuania 0.0998 -0.0659 — —   
0.1804 0.1768   
R2_adj 0.2619 0.6045 0.6086 0.6109   
Std. error of regression 0.2523 0.2459 0.2446 0.2439   
No. estimated parameters 17 17 9 9 
N 89 89 89 89 
Legenda. Column (1) is identical to Col. (3) of Table 7. Col.(2) is as Col.(1), except for the dependent variable WM1, which 
factors the same variables as FM1 but on the whole sample instead of by country. Col.(3): indicator of Rule of Law 
introduced among regressors, non significant country effects deleted. Col.(4): as Col.(3), but indicator of Corruption replaces 
Rule of Law. Standard errors below coefficient estimates. *,  **,  *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% resp. 
  “—“ indicates country-specific fixed effect restricted to zero, hence country fixed effect is given by the constant term only.  
Note that R2_adj in col. (1) is not comparable with the other columns, due to different method of estimation. 
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Table 11. Panel estimates of the macro drivers: whole-sample factor WM2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: FM2 
 
WM2 
 
WM2 
 
WM2 
Explanatory variables: 
PS c, t × Infl c, t-2 0.0202 *** 0.0173 *** 0.0168 *** 0.0169 *** 
 0.0055 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047   
PS c, t × Gini c, t-2 2.0629 *** 1.9495 *** 1.9494 *** 1.9559 *** 
 0.3057 0.3004 0.2837 0.2790   
Mortality Rate 0.0012 **   
0.0006   
Life Expectancy -0.0249 ** 
0.0118   
_cons -0.2841 *** -0.1512 * -0.4045 *** 1.5920 * 
0.0941 0.0872 0.1178 0.8613   
Bulgaria 0.0965 0.0141 — —   
0.1147 0.1234   
Czech R. -0.0839 -0.7258 *** -0.6339 *** -0.6339 *** 
0.1127 0.1094 0.0967 0.0949   
Slovakia 0.0130 -0.0594 — — 
0.0954 0.0876 
Hungary — — — —   
  
Poland 0.0781 -0.4208 *** -0.3607 *** -0.3563 *** 
0.1285 0.1251 0.1098 0.1094   
Romania 0.0614 -0.3590 *** -0.3204 *** -0.3576 *** 
0.1115 0.1082 0.0880 0.0882   
Croatia 0.0942 -0.5214 *** -0.4282 *** -0.4467 *** 
0.1431 0.1324 0.1210 0.1171   
Slovenia 0.0744 -0.1671 — —   
0.1333 0.1192   
Belarus 0.3249 ** 0.5218 *** 0.5043 *** 0.4928 *** 
0.1332 0.1056 0.0883 0.0904   
Ukraine 0.0892 0.3240 *** 0.2851 *** 0.2800 *** 
0.1265 0.1095 0.0933 0.0938   
Russia -0.1172 0.0728 — —   
0.0926 0.0842   
Estonia -0.1687 -0.3064 *** -0.3010 *** -0.3112 *** 
0.1032 0.0954 0.0723 0.0714   
Latvia 0.0598 -0.0025 — —   
0.0987 0.0868   
Lithuania -0.0885 0.0259 — —   
0.0993 0.0913   
R2_adj 0.3129 0.7522 0.7619 0.7637   
Std. error of regression 0.2078 0.2001 0.1961 0.1954   
No. estimated parameters 16 16 11 11   
N 89 89 89 89   
Legenda. Column (1) is identical to Col. (3) of Table 8. Col.(2) is as Col.(1), except for the dependent variable WM2, which 
factors the same variables as FM2 but on the whole sample instead of by country.  
 Col.(3): indicator of Mortality Rate introduced among regressors, non significant country effects deleted. Col.(4): as col.(3), 
but indicator of Life Expectancy replaces Mortality Rate.  
 Standard errors below coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% resp. 
  “—“ indicates country-specific fixed effect restricted to zero, hence country fixed effect is given by the constant term only.  
 Note that R2_adj in col. (1) is not comparable with the other columns, due to different method of estimation. 
 
 
 
